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Government Failure. A Primer in Public Choice is a book that represents a much needed 
lesson about the connection between economics and politics. Written by Gordon Tullock, 
Arthur Seldon and Gordon L. Brady, it was published in 
2005 at the Cato Institute, Washington, DC. It offers, 
according to the authors, a realistic view on these 
connections for, as Arthur Seldon says in the introduction, 
political analysts and politicians have been wrong long 
enough, and economists have delayed applying economics 
to politics for too long. Abraham Lincoln’s idea that 
governing people is done by the people and for the people is 
utopian especially now, during the last decades of the 20
th 
century and the beginning of this century, although the 
definition of democracy in the encyclopedia is still that of 
Lincoln, the government is made by and for some people, 
not ordinary people, but well organized and financed 
interest groups. As Arthur Seldon shows, it is government 
of the Busy (political activists) through the Bossy 
(government managers) for the Bully (lobby-ing activists). 
Thus, the authors highlight a tricky question: How well or 
how poorly can and will 100 or 500 elected representatives satisfy the widely differing 
choices of millions of people? Gordon Tullock, Arthur Seldon and Gordon L. Brady 
wonder if in the years to come governments will continue to impose laws, rules and 
regulations despite the growing popular desire that the economy to operate in accordance 
with the laws of free trade. For, in the opinion of the three professors, government 
interventions do more harm than good. 
The book, especially its theoretical part, uses a solid bibliography that includes works of 
Nobel prize winners in Economics: Kenneth Joseph Arrow, Friedrich August Hayek, 
Milton Friedman, James M. Buchanan, and of other leading economists such as Anthony 
Downs, Thomas Hobbes, Anne Krueger, Mancur Olson, Joseph Schumpeter and others, 
which recommends it, together with the reputation of the authors, as a quality scientific 
reading like those usually published by the Cato Institute. Its applicative part, explaining 
actual situations from the American or British everyday life makes it an interesting read and 
the principles and phenomena are easier to understand. 
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The book, written after extensive discussions between its authors, is divided into three 
parts. In the first part, Professor Gordon Tullock, one of the initiators of this theory, along 
with James M. Buchanan, presents, over seven chapters, a number of items that he 
considers crucial for inducting less knowledgeable readers in this economic approach to 
governing. In the second Part, Gordon L. Brady applies the principles stated by Gordon 
Tullock to the American realities. And in the third Part, Arthur Seldon addresses the issues 
from a British point of view. 
In the first part of the book, entitled The Theory of Public Choice, in Chapter 1, People 
are People. The Elements of Public Choice, Gordon Tullock shows that people have the 
same behaviour patterns and are motivated by the same self interest when they are making 
private choices or public choices, and the differences that occur in their behaviour in the 
two situations are more likely determined by the fact that the constraints are different. On 
private markets the choices the individual makes affects only himself, while if the voter or 
the politician makes choices on a political market, these choices affect other people. 
In this introduction to public choice theory, Gordon Tullock aims to show what this theory 
brings new in understanding the democratic process, how it differs from the rest of the 
discourse on social phenomena where the approach used to be and still is mainly of moral 
nature. 
The author shows that, starting with Plato and Aristotle, political science has been 
perceived as a way to produce morally correct policies. Until David Hume and Adam 
Smith, individuals, whether they were businessmen, civil servants, politicians or monarchs, 
were told what was right to do from the moral point of view. According to Gordon Tullock 
it was assumed that all these people were (perhaps they were) concerned with maximizing 
the public interest. Machiavelli and Hobbes made exceptions, but their writings were 
considered immoral and not contributions to a scientific system which was essentially 
amoral. According to Tullock, David Hume showed, however that most people pursued 
their own interests rather than public interest, and Adam Smith founded modern economics 
on the assumption that individuals were generally motivated by self interest and explaining 
the consequences of this in the economy. 
However, in the nineteenth century and twentieth century, the dual vision of human 
behavior has been maintained – economists assumed that individuals are primarily 
concerned with self-interest and have investigated the consequences of this fact. And 
political analysts in the same period, continued to assume that political actors were 
motivated in their actions by the public interest. 
However, public choice theory removes this type of bifurcated view on human behavior, 
because people do not change, they are the same, whether they make decisions on the 
market of goods and services, or they are in a position to make decisions as voters or 
politicians. 
Gordon Tullock shows that although the dual view of human behavior in the two cases is 
maintained and is still prevalent, from the empirical point of view most people realize that 
politicians behave in a way which shows that they are motivated by self-interest. And 
similarly, analyzing the factors that determine the vote, most people admit that the personal 
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The author also analyses how well informed are the individuals in the two situations - when 
they make private decisions on the market of goods and services and when they participate 
to the decisions on the political market. 
On the private market, the citizens will allocate time and money to be as informed as they 
can be, because they are aware that an error will directly affect them. But when they vote, 
they believe it is unlikely their individual vote to affect the final outcome of the vote. The 
low valuation that they place on their vote makes individuals not invest too much to collect 
information. And if the designers of automobiles, for example, are aware that a buyer will 
be well informed when purchasing a product of their own, the politicians also know the 
degree of information of the citizens on political issues and, therefore, they create laws that 
will attract the not so well informed voters.  
In contrast to the low general political information, certain interest groups are very familiar 
with regulations that directly affect them - the farmers will know a lot about agricultural 
subsidies, producers will know all about import restrictions on competing products etc. 
From this contrast appears, as Gordon Tullock shows, the presence of the special interest 
groups on the political market and, what is most important, the attention given by 
politicians to these groups. 
Gordon Tullock continues to discuss this and other problems resulting from even his 
reasoning: Is a democratic government preferable or a nondemocratic one? Do we leave 
everything to the market or is the democratic government, with its inherent minuses, still 
necessary? What are the costs and benefits of government? 
Returning to the central and perhaps most exciting issue - the acceptance that governments 
mainly pursue their own interest - the author shows that the interests of the citizens and of 
the stakeholders of the companies will be more likely reached if it is in the interest of the 
politicians for that to happen. Of course, the altruistic and compassionate natural human 
inclinations are not denied. However, according to Gordon Tullock, reality shows quite 
strongly that the prosecution for reasons other than self-interest does not seem to lead to 
achieving long-term performance. 
Issues such as market imperfections and government imperfections are also addressed. 
Imperfections of the market processes do not necessarily require government intervention, 
says the author. And government activities can also be undoubtedly improved. 
Another matter studied by public choice theory is the design of government and there are 
two issues here. One aspect is that of considering in a serious and scientific way the market 
alternatives to government. And the second area is related to determining the optimal size 
of government units, taking into account a much higher degree of decentralization. The 
development of techniques that make it possible, at least in theory, to determine what an 
optimal government unit is has contributed greatly to this new view. The idea that we can 
adjust sizes of government so it fits our needs has led to another element - local 
government, referring to small communities. 
Regarding the behavior of government officials, given the low level of political information 
of the governed, according to the public choice theory, on the political market the deception 
to voters, manipulation techniques we say, is more likely to be a worthwhile tactic than it is 
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In the following chapters that make up the first part of the book issues such as voting 
paradoxes (Chapter 2, Voting paradoxes), making mentions of the Roman Republic, the 
British electoral system and the forms of government in some other English-speaking 
countries, the median preference theorem for voting, coalitions and moral principles, 
logrolling (Chapter 3, Logrolling), with its advantages and disadvantages, and its moral 
aspects, without forgetting, of course, the lobby, with benefits concentrated on small groups 
of interests and high costs, but diffuse, distributed to the population are discussed, in more 
detail, from a theoretical point of view,. 
A special chapter, Chapter 4, The cost of rent-seeking, is dedicated to the costs of the rent-
seeking activities - a brief history of the phenomenon, and the negative direct and indirect 
effects of these activities. 
Chapter 5, Bureaucracy, is obviously dedicated to the bureaucracy, American and British 
bureaucracy, discussing bureaucratic interests, government bureaucracy, but also private 
bureaucracy, the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians, as well as those between 
bureaucrats and lobbyists. 
Chapter 6, Tax “Avoision”, refers to tax avoidance and tax evasion. For the two phenomena 
Arhur Seldon invented a new word in English: "avoision" that includes them both. 
Chapter 7, called Federalism, refers to the federal systems. Issues such great variety of 
preferences that voters may have in a country, especially in a large country like the U.S., 
the degrees of decentralization and purely local decisions are uncorked. 
A phenomenon brought into discussion about the federal states is that of "voting with the 
feet". Because residents can choose where to live or where to develop their businesses, 
local governments are in competition with each other. With this option, individuals can 
influence government activity by voting in that area. In this way they start by choosing a 
place that they like and then they try to make the place even more enjoyable through their 
vote. As an example, Gordon Tullock refers to East Germany that has been threatened with 
depopulation due to "voting with the feet", which is why the communist authorities have 
built the Berlin Wall. 
In  the second part of the book, called American Applications, Gordon L. Brady 
highlights some aspects of American reality that support the understanding of the public 
choice theory. 
A first issue, the protectionism, brings to the fore in Chapter 8, Protection in international 
trade, practices as logrolling and rent-seeking with their long-term negative economic 
implications. 
Protectionism may occur largely because producers, few in number compared with the 
mass of consumers, are much better organized. Import restriction measures that support 
domestic producers, Gordon L. Brady shows, are detrimental to consumers whose interest 
is to buy goods at the lowest possible price. And the protectionist practices that restrict free 
trade are argued in such a manner so that even citizens who are affected by them consider 
that these measures are beneficial. Thus, governments that use various forms of 
protectionism (in fact all governments do so) justify by the fact that they protect domestic 
strategic industries from foreign competition, strengthen the young industries, create 
economic growth, protect jobs, etc. AE  Government Failure, Always a Topical Matter 
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Public choice theory offers two explanations for the supply and demand for such protective 
measures: 
•  logrolling, exchange of votes among politicians in the legislative assemblies; 
•  rent-seeking practices involving lobby for obtaining governmental favors. 
In relation to international trade regulation - the logrolling process, often considered 
beneficial by economists, can have harmful effects. For example, the author says, 
politicians can make an exchange of votes for measures meant to protect regional industries 
- a textile industry in California or a Louisiana sugar producers will be protected as a result 
of such an arrangement because small and well organized groups are often successful even 
when cost-benefit calculations do not justify such measures of protection. 
Logrolling, according to the public choice theory, allows elected representatives to express 
their preference intensity. Thus, politicians who want to obtain a success related to animal 
protection can exchange votes for other issues they are not so interested in. However, given 
the fact that most of the legislative assemblies are formed based on geographical 
representation, politicians will follow their own interests, namely to represent the interests 
of the citizens in the region of origin in order to be reelected. Among these interests of 
local, regional nature, are often measures to protect individual industries (along with many 
other issues that may arise). In these cases logrolling at national scale can be inefficient 
because politicians change votes in favor of local interests against issues with national 
implications.  
Another problem addressed by Gordon L. Brady in Chapter 9, Internet Governance, is the 
regulation of the Internet. He examines Internet governance from the perspective of public 
choice theory, given the role of lobbyists, politicians and bureaucrats in their attempt to 
control the general revenue, and the institutions that will influence its further development. 
Seen through the lens of public choice, those governing the usage of Internet are not 
motivated by consumer welfare, by the efficiency generated by the competition or by the 
economic surplus created by technological innovation, but rather, indicates the author, 
government intervention on the Internet could be explained by interactions of bureaucrats 
with various interest groups. 
For example, the granting of domains .org or .com, for non-profit or commercial 
organizations. People may have, the author shows, a greater tendency to buy products and 
services from an entity with an Internet domain .org, than one with a domain .com, which 
may lead entrepreneurs to invest resources to obtain such .org domains. For this reason 
those who give these Internet domains can use price discrimination and bribery. 
The Internet, shows Gordon L. Brady, is under the siege of those who wish to use 
regulations from the United States (through the Federal Communications Commision) and 
international (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, World Intellectual 
Property Organisation) which encourage rent-seeking activities. These regulations can slow 
down and even discourage the development of the Internet. 
Another area in which Gordon L. Brady applies public choice theory is that of 
telecommunications in the United States. In Chapter 10, Applying public choice to 
telecommunications, rent-seeking analysis is used to examine the prospects for 
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other elements that enhance international competition are considered. Removing the 
barriers imposed by regulations represents a way to stimulate innovation and improve 
resource allocation in the telecommunications industry and the author refers to both the 
U.S. and the international such industry. Public choice theory contributes to understanding 
the phenomena, bringing to light such rent-seeking obstacles in the way of the market 
liberalization. 
The last chapter of this second part, chapter 11, Applying public choice theory to 
environmental policy, is dedicated, as the title says, to the problems of the environment and 
to the way in which the government deals with them. Clean Air Act regulations are 
explained, how they have occurred and why it is difficult have them changed. 
Environmental policy, the author shows, is the result of interactions between scientists, 
politicians, environmentalists, bureaucrats and interest groups, taking into account 
economic, social, legal and political issues. 
In the third part, called Public choice in Britain, Arthur Seldon, (Chapters 12-18 – Public 
choice or political sovereignty?,  Government intentions and consequences, 
Overdependence on the welfare state,  The weakening of the family,  Voters versus 
consumers, The political fate of economic federalism) examines in terms of public choice 
theory issues concerning British social welfare and services related thereto. The analysis 
aims to explain the fact that decisions on social welfare in the United Kingdom are 
collective and not individual. The excuses used for the transfer of these services from the 
public area to the private area were mixed: on education, healthcare and pension they have 
a very slow development and provide services to too few people. It has been said that only 
the government can accelerate their development and provide to the citizens these services 
more widely. The author supports his claims with arguments and examples. In 1870, he 
tells us, entered into force the Education Act (Education Act) which introduced free public 
education although until 1860 and even before three of four children belonging to the 
working class had gone to schools belonging to the private education and had paid tuition 
fees with the help of the church and charitable organizations. 
British social welfare services brought into discussion by Arthur Seldon in this part of the 
book are education, healthcare, housing provision for people with low incomes, income 
insurance against disruptions in sickness, unemployment and retirement, and protection for 
everyday risks. 
He points out that the politicized public institutions are not primarily concerned with the 
options of the public as individuals and families. This is explained by the fact that 
collective decisions are taken by representatives of the public and not the public itself, 
which leads to public goods and services very different from what the citizens would 
choose if they participated directly in decision making. The idea that the author emphasizes 
is that the welfare state, created to help people most in need, has done much worse. 
The work, in its assembly, raises the interest of the readers through the topical issues and 
concrete examples of American and British reality, that are similar, in many ways, to 
situations from the political, economic and social market in our country. We invite you to 
reading and reflection. 
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